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Abstract
This study examines the time-varying performance of investment
strategies following analyst recommendation revisions in the UK
stock market, with specific emphasis on the impact of changing mar-
ket conditions. We find a negative relationship between the rec-
ommendation performance and market conditions as measured in
terms of past market return and market volatility. In particular, the
upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates significantly positive (neg-
ative) net abnormal returns in bad market conditions (e.g., the dot-
com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007), but not in
other periods of time.Moreover, our non-temporal threshold regres-
sion analysis shows that the reported negative relationship disap-
pears when market conditions become better, i.e., when the past
market return (market volatility) is higher (lower) than a certain level,
indicating the importance of taking non-linearity into account in the
long sample period as examined in this study. Our time-series boot-
strap simulations further confirm that the superior recommendation
performance in bad market conditions is not due to random chance;
analysts have certain skills in making valuable up/downward revi-
sions in badmarkets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There are numerous studies on the information role of financial analysts, while the existing literature mostly ignores
thequestionofwhether theperformanceof their stock recommendations is related to the state of the economy (Chang
& Choi, 2017; Loh & Stulz, 2018). Loh and Stulz (2018) provide empirical evidence showing that analysts’ advice (e.g.,
stock recommendations and earnings forecasts) is more valuable in badmarket conditions. They further argue that, in
badmarket conditions, analystswork harder andmarket investors relymore on analysts’ advice than onother informa-
tion sources. This argument, however, does not seem to alignwith the common sense view that badmarket conditions,
such as financial crises and recessions, usually give rise to increased uncertainty, making it much harder for analysts
to make accurate stock recommendations (see, Amiram, Landsman, Owens, & Stubben, 2018; Bloom, 2009; Chopra,
1998). For example, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2003) report that in the years of 2000 and 2001 after
the dot-com bubble burst, themost (least) favorable analyst recommendations lead to an average annualized abnormal
return of –7.06% (13.44%).
In contributing to this debate, we shed fresh light on the time-varying performance of UK analyst recommendation
revisions, with specific emphasis on the impact of market conditions. Our particular attention to the UK stock mar-
ket is motivated by the following considerations. Specifically, despite the existence of extensive analyst research in
the US market, empirical evidence on the performance of analyst recommendations remains mixed and far from con-
clusive (see relevant literature in Section 2). Jegadeesh and Kim (2006, p. 275) call for an in-depth investigation into
other developedmarkets to provide “amore comprehensive picture of the extent towhich the unique skills of analysts
are useful for investors”. The UK stock market, as a highly developed and sophisticated market, offers an appropriate
setting to examine the recommendation performance and its implication onmarket efficiency. In particular, its institu-
tional settings and trading practices are partially different fromand independent of those in theUSmarket;1 as a result,
the existing US evidence may not justify the UK investment practices. However, there is surprisingly little related ana-
lyst research in the UK stock market, except for two published studies that report conflicting results, using very small
samples over relatively short time periods. For example, Dimson and Fraletti (1986) examine an unpublished sample
of 1,649 telephone recommendationsmade by oneUK broker in 1983 and find no significant abnormal returns for the
recommended stocks. Ryan and Taffler (2006, p. 372) argue that the sample of analyst recommendations employed in
Dimson and Fraletti (1986) is made by “a single UK brokerage house only and is biased towards large capitalization
stocks”. Ryan and Taffler (2006) investigate 2,506 analyst recommendation revisions made by six London-based bro-
kers fromDecember 1993 to June 1995, showing that stock prices are significantly affected by the changes in analyst
recommendations.
This study examines a comprehensive sample of 70,220UK analyst recommendation revisions over the period Jan-
uary 1995 to June 2013. As such, our sample is much larger than has been employed in the two prior UK studies; the
long sample period also helps identify the evolution of the recommendation performance in different market condi-
tions. Specifically, we construct an upgrade portfolio, including all upgrades to buy-related stock recommendations
from previous sell/hold-related stock recommendations, as well as a downgrade portfolio, including all downgrades to
sell/hold-related stock recommendations from previous buy-related stock recommendations. The up/downgrade port-
folio is updated daily; for each up/downward revision, the recommended stock enters the up/downgrade portfolio at
the close of trading on the day the revision is announced and then remains in the portfolio for up to five trading days
(oneweek). LikeBarber, Lehavy,McNichols, andTrueman (2001), we take an investor-oriented, calendar-time perspec-
tive to track the evolution of the portfolio performance on a rolling window basis.2 This allows us to directly measure
the time-varying performance of the up/downgrade portfolios using the intercepts derived from various asset pricing
models and to estimate portfolio turnover. Consequently, we are able to determinate whether the up/downgrade port-
folio can generate statistically significant net abnormal returns over time, after taking transaction costs into account
(see, also, Barber et al., 2001). Accordingly, our empirical investigations proceed in three major parts using various
alternative regressionmodels.
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In the first part of our investigations, our rollingwindowanalysis results identify that theperformanceof theupgrade
and downgrade portfolios varies considerably over time. In particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates sig-
nificantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns in two periods of bad market conditions, i.e., the dot-com bubble
burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007, but not in the rest of the sample period, in line with Loh and Stulz (2018).
For example, the significantly positive daily net abnormal returns to the upgrade portfolio are observed over the period
June 2000 toMay 2002, ranging from 3.454 to 5.414 basis points (8.704% to 13.643% annualized; p-value≤ 0.05) and
over the period June 2007 to May 2008, ranging from 3.300 to 4.948 basis points (8.316% to 12.469% annualized;
p-value≤ 0.05). Similarly, the downgrade portfolio generates significantly negative daily net abnormal returns over the
period June 2000 to March 2003, ranging from –3.970 to –7.255 basis points (–10.004% to –18.283% annualized;
p-value≤0.05) and over the period July 2007 toDecember 2009, ranging from–2.661 to –7.023basis points (–6.706%
to –17.698% annualized; p-value≤ 0.05).
In the second part, we follow Derrien andWomack (2003) to measure market conditions as a continuous variable,
in terms of past market return or market volatility (see, also, Chang & Choi, 2017). We run the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions to formally test the impact of market conditions on the recommendation performance. Our OLS
regression results show that the up/downgrade portfolio leads to superior performance in the face of more uncertainty
shocks (i.e., lower market return and/or higher market volatility). For example, a decrease (increase) of 1% on the daily
market return (market volatility), on average, gives rise to an increase of 2.780% (2.510%) in the performance of the
upgrade portfolio. Similar evidence is found for the performance of the downgrade portfolio, in support of the findings
in the first part of our investigations.
A recent study of Chan, Hansen, and Timmermann (2017) argues that it could be difficult for standard linear
regression models to evaluate market properties during a long-term time period including various market conditions.
In the third part of our empirical investigations, we employ the non-temporal threshold testing procedure originally
proposed by Hansen (2000) to explore whether the dynamic recommendation performance is sensitive to changing
market conditions. The non-temporal threshold model allows for regime-switching and identifying different market
conditions endogenously. It also allows the non-linear effect to be driven by observable variables, but the number
and value of thresholds are unknown a priori (see, Chan et al., 2017). Our non-temporal analysis confirms the negative
relationship between the recommendation performance and market conditions, e.g., the superior recommendation
performance in bad market conditions, consistent with those found in the first and second parts of our empirical
investigations. However, once market conditions become better and exceed a certain level, the observed negative
relationship disappears. Our results imply the importance of taking non-linearity into account when analyzing the
impact of market conditions on the recommendation performance in the long sample period as examined in this
study.
This study contributes to the analyst literature in several ways. First, the existing analyst research attributes the
value of analyst recommendations to various factors, e.g., conflicts of interest, analyst reputation, timing, momentum,
herding, and so on (seemore details in Section 2), while the impact of changingmarket conditions has received compar-
atively little attention (see, e.g., Chang & Choi, 2017; Loh & Stulz, 2018). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study to examine the relationship between market conditions and the recommendation performance in the UK stock
market using various alternative methodological approaches, in particular, the non-temporal threshold regression
model that has not been employed in prior analyst research. In addition, we provide some out-of-sample evidence to
complement the existing analyst literature–the superior recommendation performance in bad market conditions in
the UK market–that is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful to market investors. From
an investor’s perspective, it is possible for market investors to make profits by purchasing (short selling) stocks with
upward (downward) revisions in bad market conditions with high uncertainty, even after accounting for transaction
costs. Finally, our results hold up against an array of robustness checks, including bootstrap simulations and various
asset pricing models. For example, to rule out the concern that the observed superior recommendation performance
in bad market conditions might be spurious (see, Barber et al., 2001; Fama, 1998), we develop a time-series bootstrap
simulation method to distinguish analysts’ skill from luck. Our bootstrap simulations confirm that the observed
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superior recommendation performance in bad market conditions is not due to analysts’ luck (i.e., random chance), but
due to analysts’ skill. That is, financial analysts possess sufficient skill to make valuable up/downward revisions in bad
market conditions. Also, our results are robust to various single- and multi-factor assets pricing models, ruling out
Barber et al. (2001) concern that the observed superior recommendation performance in badmarket conditions could
be due to a poormodel of asset pricing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews related analyst literature and develops
ourmajor hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data andmethodology. Section 4 presents empirical results, followed by
various robustness checks in Section 5. The final section concludes.
2 RELATED ANALYST LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Financial analysts play an important role as information intermediaries in the capital market, collecting and analyzing a
wide variety of market, industry, and firm-specific information, and then making stock recommendations to investors.
A significant body of academic research has been devoted to investigating the question ofwhether investors can profit
from analyst recommendations since the seminal work of Cowles (1933), while there is a clear gap between theory
and practice regarding this issue. For example, almost all brokerage housesmake great efforts and spend large sums of
money on security analysis; as a result, their analyst recommendations have been widely used by market participants
whenmaking investment decisions. However, the semi-strong formofmarket efficiency implies that it is impossible for
investors tomake profits by using publicly available information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that if prices fully
reflect all publicly available information, then the use of analyst recommendations cannot generate superior returns,
and brokerage houses should not spend massive money on security analysis, nor should investors have any incentives
to pay for such costly information.
Much of the early evidence shows that investors are not able to add value to the market when they follow analyst
recommendations. Dimson andMarsh (1984, p. 1259) summarize 27 early studies on the value of analyst recommen-
dations documenting that “the profitability opportunities disclosed by these studies are, however, limited”. In contrast,
Stickel (1995) andWomack (1996) report that upgrades anddowngrades are respectively accompaniedby significantly
positive and negative returns at the time of their announcements (see, also, Barber et al., 2001; Boni &Womack, 2006;
Green, 2006; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, & Agarwal, 2009; among others),3
which seems not to be in accord with semi-strong form market efficiency. However, Barber et al. (2001) argue that
these investment strategies require a great deal of trading andgenerate considerable transaction costs, suggesting that
the apparent market inefficiency might not be easily exploitable by investors (see, also, Hall & Tacon, 2010; Jegadeesh
et al., 2004;Mikhail,Walther,&Willis, 2004). Therefore, in this study,weevaluate theperformanceof theup/downgrade
portfolio after accounting for transaction costs, that is, the portfolio performance is measured as the gross returns
(estimated from various single- and multi-factor asset pricing models) less the estimated transaction costs multiplied
by the corresponding daily portfolio turnover (see details in Subsection 3.3.2).
The existing research attributes the value of analyst recommendations to a variety of factors, such as conflicts of
interest (see, Mehran & Stulz, 2007; Shen & Chih, 2009), analyst reputation (see, Emery & Li, 2009; Fang & Yasuda,
2009, 2014; Kucheev, Ruiz, & Sorensson, 2017), industry (see, Boni &Womack, 2006; Bradley, Gokkaya, & Liu, 2017;
Merkley, Michaely, & Pacelli, 2017), timing (see, Green, 2006; Irvine, Lipson, & Puckett, 2007; Ivkovic & Jegadeesh,
2004), herding (see, Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010; Trueman, 1994), and so on. A very recent study by Loh and Stulz (2018)
argues that the usefulness and performance of analysts could be dependent on bad market conditions, though little
attentionhasbeenpaid to this hypothesis.On theonehand, it iswell known that badmarket conditions tend to give rise
to increased uncertainty (Bloom, 2009), so it should bemore difficult for analysts tomake accurate stock recommenda-
tions and earnings forecasts (see, e.g., Amiram et al., 2018; Chopra, 1998; Forbes, Murphy, O’Keeffe, & Su, 2020). Also,
the decline in trading volume and hence broker profits in bad market conditions may reduce analysts’ performance
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rewards, leading to a decrease in analysts’ motivation. On the other hand, a theoretical model proposed byKacperczyk
and Seru (2007) suggests that investors rely more on analysts’ advice than on other information sources. In partic-
ular, in bad market conditions with high uncertainty, investors’ private information or information-processing ability
becomes much noisier, making it more difficult for them to understand the information contained in financial docu-
ments and to assess the consequences of uncertainty shocks. High uncertainty, therefore, drives investor demand for
information from financial analysts, as they aremoreexperiencedand informedandbetter able to evaluateuncertainty
shocks in bad market conditions (see, Amiram et al., 2018; Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, & Veldkamp, 2016; Loh &
Stulz, 2011). To the extent that the role of analysts is tomake sense of firms in the face of uncertainty, they shouldwork
harder in bad market condition due to career concerns (Loh & Stulz, 2018). For example, Merkley et al. (2017) show
that analysts revise their earnings forecasts more frequently and release longer reports in badmarket conditions.
If financial analysts can truly add value in bad market conditions, we may feel more confident in their overall role
in predicting the nation’s corporate prospects. We expect analysts to produce high quality stock recommendations to
help investors understand the potential impact of uncertainty shocks in bad market conditions. Accordingly, we test
the followingmain hypotheses relating to the proposition that analyst recommendation revisions aremore valuable in
badmarket conditions. That is,
Hypothesis 1a: The average net abnormal return to the upgrade portfolio is significantly positive in badmarket condi-
tions, but is statistically insignificant in the rest of the sample period;
Hypothesis 1b: The average net abnormal return to the downgrade portfolio is significantly negative in bad market
conditions, but is statistically insignificant in the rest of the sample period.
3 DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Data and sample selection
We obtain real-time UK analyst recommendations from the Morningstar Extracted Data File: Historic Broker Recommen-
dations for UK Registered and UK Listed Companies, uniquely created by Morningstar Company Intelligence.4 Each stock
recommendation record contains information on the nameof the recommended firm, the nameof the brokerage house
issuing the recommendation, the starting and expiration dates of the recommendation, and a rating between 1 and 9
(1= strong buy; 2= buy; 3=weak buy; 4=weak buy/hold; 5= hold; 6= hold/sell; 7=weak sell; 8= sell; and 9= strong
sell). According to Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) and Altinkilic et al. (2013), we also exclude those stock recommen-
dations made in the three days around quarterly earnings announcements (see, also, Loh & Stulz, 2011). We further
require that the gap between the starting and expiration dates of the recommendation is less than one year to ensure
that the brokerage house actively follows the recommended stock. The relevant financial data for the recommended
firms are obtained from the London Share Price Database (LSPD).
Our initial sample is comprised of 384,165 publicly available analyst recommendations made by 144 brokerage
houses on 2,905 distinct firms listed either on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period January 1995 to June
2013. To allow for an easy and intuitive comparison with prior analyst research, we reclassify all original analyst rec-
ommendations into five categories: Strong Buys (1 & 2; 44.99%), Buys (3 & 4; 10.66%), Holds (5; 32.43%), Sells (6 & 7;
3.68%), and Strong Sells (8 & 9; 8.24%). The distribution of UK analyst recommendations in theMorningstar database is
similar to that reported in prior US studies (see details in Appendix A).
Financial analysts, however, often leave their stock recommendations unchanged for long periods, with an average
gap of 68 days between the starting and expiration dates in the UK (see Appendix A). Analyst recommendations
thus become stale and less informed over time, potentially resulting in poor portfolio performance (see, Boni &
Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006; Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Therefore, our study exclusively focuses on analyst
recommendation revisions, which tend to convey more valuable information and have stronger predictive power.
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TABLE 1 The transitionmatrix of UK analyst recommendation revisions
To new rating
From old rating
Strong
Buy (1 & 2) Buy (3 & 4) Hold (5) Sell (6 & 7)
Strong Sell
(8 & 9) Total %
Strong Buy (1 & 2) — 5,923 14,506 396 977 21,802 31.05
Buy (3 & 4) 5,756 — 5,242 682 204 11,884 16.92
Hold (5) 12,745 5,267 — 2,596 4,927 25,535 36.36
Sell (6 & 7) 298 630 2,410 — 844 4,182 5.96
Strong Sell (8 & 9) 833 172 5,043 769 — 6,817 9.71
Overall 19,632 11,992 27,201 4,443 6,952 70,220 —
% 27.96 17.08 38.73 6.33 9.90 — 100.00
Note: This table presents the transition matrix of 70,220 UK analyst recommendation revisions over the period January 1995
to June 2013. All real-time analyst recommendations are obtained fromMorningstar Company Intelligence. A rating of 1 reflects
a strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell, which are
reclassified into five categories: Strong Buy (1 & 2), Buy (3 & 4), Hold (5), Sell (6 & 7), and Strong Sell (8 & 9).
Table 1 presents the transitionmatrix of our final sample of 70,220UK analyst recommendation revisions, i.e., 45.04%
are Strong Buys and Buys, 38.73% areHolds, and 16.23% are Sells and Strong Sells. As such, our dataset is much larger
than has been employed in two prior UK studies of Dimson and Fraletti (1986) and Ryan and Taffler (2006), while the
long sample period of January 1995 to June 2013 allows us to observe the evolution of the portfolio performance in
different market conditions. The inclusion of 23,235 (33.09%) analyst recommendation revisions on 1,244 dead firms
in our sample also helps alleviate the potential survivorship bias.
3.2 Portfolio construction
Toevaluate the performance of calendar-time investment strategies basedon analyst recommendation revisions in the
UKmarket,we construct twoportfolios: (i) an upgradeportfolio, consisting of all stockswith upward revisions to Strong
Buy or Buy recommendations from previous Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold recommendations; and (ii) a downgrade portfolio,
consisting of all stocks with downward revisions to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold recommendations from previous Strong
Buy or Buy recommendations. Specifically, the upgrade portfolio is updated daily; for each upward revision, the recom-
mended stock enters the upgrade portfolio at the close of trading on the day the revision is announced. If an upward
revision is announced on a non-trading day, the recommended stock is added into the upgrade portfolio at the close
of the next trading day. The recommended stock then remains in the portfolio for up to five trading days (one week)
after the revision is announced to explore the short-term market reaction to analyst recommendation revisions.5 ,6
The downgrade portfolio is constructed in an analogous fashion.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution of upward and downward revisions in the upgrade and downgrade port-
folios, respectively, in each recommendation year. The total number of analyst recommendation revisions included
in the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, 56,075 (= 25,701 + 30,374), appears to be less than 70,220, as shown
in Table 1, which is not surprising, however. The upward revisions from Strong Sells to Sells, from Strong Sells
to Holds, and from Sells to Holds are not included in the upgrade portfolio, as they can also be interpreted as
negative recommendations. Similarly, the downward revisions from Strong Buys to Buys are not included in the
downgrade portfolio, as they can also be interpreted as positive recommendations (see, also, Stickel, 1995). Panel
B of Table 2 presents the distribution of upward and downward revisions in the upgrade and downgrade portfo-
lios, respectively, in each industry category, according to the two-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
codes.7
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TABLE 2 The distribution of UK analyst recommendation revisions in the upgrade and downgrade portfolios
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
No. of
firms
covered
No. of
broker-
age
houses
Average
rating
No. of
upward
revisions
No. of
covered
firms
No. of
broker-
age
houses
Average
rating
No. of
down-
ward
revisions
Panel A: The recommendation year
1995 340 22 1.15 621 422 21 3.68 982
1996 603 37 1.20 1,498 585 34 3.54 1,715
1997 654 46 1.23 1,978 654 45 3.54 2,389
1998 660 37 1.28 1,936 654 39 3.59 2,395
1999 625 40 1.28 1,993 618 41 3.53 1,801
2000 513 39 1.27 1,419 512 39 3.45 1,496
2001 530 41 1.26 1,331 616 40 3.64 2,074
2002 567 41 1.24 1,341 569 42 3.74 1,480
2003 507 41 1.22 1,165 566 39 3.64 1,591
2004 578 43 1.24 1,499 558 47 3.65 1,818
2005 602 41 1.28 1,628 629 45 3.62 2,182
2006 575 44 1.28 1,608 600 44 3.56 1,834
2007 573 38 1.24 1,581 544 41 3.52 1,448
2008 488 41 1.21 1,204 548 39 3.67 1,680
2009 569 47 1.19 1,849 560 48 3.61 1,953
2010 470 39 1.20 1,145 436 36 3.43 1,192
2011 419 35 1.18 977 414 33 3.43 1,022
2012 340 28 1.16 665 409 29 3.49 957
2013 (January to June) 192 24 1.21 263 234 22 3.53 365
Panel B: The ICB industry category
05Oil & Gas 84 69 1.24 1,050 89 68 3.60 1,089
13 Chemicals 39 52 1.24 701 40 54 3.44 763
17 Basic Resources 74 55 1.22 621 72 58 3.67 767
23 Construction &Materials 66 54 1.26 929 64 58 3.61 1,022
27 Industrial Goods & Services 438 79 1.25 5,808 469 89 3.49 6,365
33 Automobiles & Parts 14 35 1.26 184 18 43 3.56 245
35 Food & Beverage 60 53 1.25 1,081 67 58 3.60 1,396
37 Personal &Household Goods 115 61 1.25 1,451 129 67 3.55 1,665
45Health Care 103 67 1.22 948 114 66 3.52 1,161
53 Retail 130 71 1.25 2,782 143 75 3.75 4,005
55Media 130 66 1.22 1,252 139 66 3.46 1,375
57 Travel & Leisure 143 70 1.19 2,462 149 76 3.55 2,944
65 Telecommunications 32 58 1.15 318 33 57 3.63 363
75Utilities 32 44 1.23 551 29 45 3.64 666
83 Banks 14 49 1.23 606 15 48 3.84 806
85 Insurance 60 52 1.31 967 62 52 3.54 999
(Continues)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Panel B: The ICB industry category
87 Financial Services 213 70 1.27 2,173 215 71 3.52 2,376
95 Technology 211 74 1.17 1,817 233 75 3.62 2,367
Overall 1,958 111 1.24 25,701 2,081 109 3.58 30,374
Note: Panel A of this table presents the distribution of 25,701 upward (30,374 downward) changes in analyst recommenda-
tions in the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio over the period January 1993 to June 2013 by the recommendation year, in terms of
the number of recommended firms, the number of brokerage houses, as well as the average rating and number of analyst rec-
ommendation revisions. Panel B of this table presents the distribution of all upward and downward revisions by the industry
category, according to the two-digit ICB codes (see full details and description of the ICB at: http://www.icbenchmark.com). All
real-time analyst recommendations are obtained fromMorningstar Company Intelligence. A rating of 1 reflects a strong buy, 2
a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell, which are reclassified
into five categories: Strong Buy (1 & 2), Buy (3 & 4), Hold (5), Sell (6 & 7), and Strong Sell (8 & 9). An upgrade portfolio consists
of all upward revisions to Strong buy or Buy from previous Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold, while a downgrade portfolio consists of
all downgrades to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold from previous Strong Buy or Buy. The upgrade portfolio does not include upward
revisions from Strong Sell to Hold, from Strong Sell to Sell, and from Sell to Hold, which can also be interpreted as negative
recommendations, while the downgrade portfolio does not include downward revisions from Strong Buy to Buy, which can also
be interpreted as positive recommendations.We report the average rating for analyst recommendation revisions based on the
five-point rating scale.
3.3 Portfolio performance evaluation
3.3.1 The gross returns to the up/downgrade portfolio
Like Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), we apply an equal monetary investment in each analyst recommendation
revision, and calculate the daily value-weighted return to the upgrade or downgrade portfolio on date t:
Rp,t =
(
nt∑
i=1
xi,t × Ri,t
)/ nt∑
i=1
xi,t , (1)
where Ri,t represents the daily return for the recommended stock i on date t;
8 nt represents the number of upward
(downward) revisions in the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio p at the close of trading of the revision date through date
t –1; xi,t represents the compounded daily return for the recommended stock i from the closing of trading on the revi-
sion date through date t –1 (xi,t = 1 for a stock recommended on date t –1).
9
The gross returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios are estimated using the intercept termof �p derived from
the capital asset pricingmodel (CAPM):
Rp,t − Rf,t = �p + �p
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �p,t , (2)
where Rp,t and Rm,t represent the daily return on the portfolio and on the FTSE All-Share Index, respectively; Rf,t repre-
sents the daily three-month UK T-bill rate; �p,t represents the error term.
We estimate Eq. (2) repeatedly on a rolling window basis–a one-year window length rolling one trading day
forward–to track the time-varying performance of the underlying variables over our long sample period. Specifically,
the first rolling window is from January 2, 1995 to December 29, 1995, covering 252 trading days–the typical number
of trading days in a year in the UK stock market. Then, a new observation (trading day) is added to the rolling window,
while the first one observation is dropped, that is, we update the rolling window to include observations from January
3, 1995 to January 2, 1996, and so forth. In each rolling window, a significantly positive (negative) �p indicates that
the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio is profitable after controlling for market risk. This calculation, therefore, generates
a time series of 4,420 daily gross returns to the upgrade or downgrade portfolio, over the period January 1996 to June
2013.
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3.3.2 The abnormal returns net of transaction costs
In this study, we focus on the average daily net abnormal returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios after tak-
ing transaction costs into account, that is, we consider markets to be inefficient only if the gross returns estimated
from various asset pricingmodels are large enough to cover the size of transaction costs (see, Timmermann&Granger,
2004). Keim and Madhavan (1998) categorize transaction costs into explicit costs (e.g., brokerage commissions and
taxes) and implicit costs (e.g., bid-ask spread andmarket impact of trading). Hudson, Dempsey, andKeasey (1996) show
that the total round-trip transaction costs in the UK stock market for the most favored of investors is upward of 1.0%,
including government stamp duty of 0.5%, negotiated brokerage commission of 0.1% (soft commissions could be zero
if alternative services are offered in lieu of cash), and bid-ask spread of 0.5%. Based on a relatively cautious estimate of
the average round-trip transaction costs in the UK for purchasing stocks at 1.5% and for short selling stocks at 3.0%,10
wemeasure the round-trip transaction costs multiplied by the corresponding average daily portfolio turnover in each
rolling window.
Specifically, the daily turnover for the portfolio on the trading date t is defined as the percentage of stocks in the
portfolio as of the close of trading on date t –1 that have been sold off by the close of trading on date t. That is, like
Barber et al. (2001), we measure the daily turnover as the percentage of the portfolio that has been moved into some
other set of stocks on date t. For each stock i in portfolio p as of the close of trading on date t–1,we calculate its fraction
of the portfolio,Gi,t, at the end of trading on date twithout accounting for portfolio rebalancing:
Gi,t = �i,t−1 ×
(
1 + Ri,t
)
/ np,t−1∑
i=1
�i,t−1 ×
(
1 + Ri,t
)
. (3)
Then, Gi,t is compared to the actual fraction Fi,t that stock imakes up of portfolio p as of the close of trading on date t,
after accounting for any portfolio rebalancing. Finally, the change in the percentage holding of each stock on date t –1
is summed, generating the portfolio turnover on date t:
TURNOVERp,t =
np,t∑
i=1
||Gi,t − Fi,t|| . (4)
In each rollingwindow, we calculate the net abnormal returns as the gross returns less the estimated transaction costs
multiplied by the corresponding daily portfolio turnover.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Subsection 4.1, our rollingwindow analysis results show significantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns to the
upgrade (downgrade) portfolio in two periods of bad market conditions. In Subsection 4.2, we formally test the impact
of changingmarket conditions on the performance of analyst recommendation revisions, confirming the existence of a
significantly negative relationship between the recommendation performance and market conditions, measured as in
terms of past market return and/or market volatility. In Subsection 4.3, our non-temporal threshold regression results
confirm that the observed negative relationship disappears when market conditions become better, i.e., when past
market return (market volatility) is higher (lower) than a certain level.
4.1 Rolling window analysis results
Figure 1a (1b) illustrates the time-varying average daily abnormal returns net of transaction costs to the upgrade (down-
grade) portfolio under theCAPM, alongwith the corresponding t-statistics. Specifically, the net abnormal returns to the
upgrade and downgrade portfolios vary over time and, in particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates signifi-
cantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns in two periods of bad market conditions, i.e., the dot-com bubble burst
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F IGURE 1 The time-varying daily net abnormal returns to the up/downgrade portfolio and the corresponding
t-statistics under the CAPM, over the period January 1996 to June 2013 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007. Figure 1a illustrates that the net abnormal returns to the upgrade portfolio ini-
tially fluctuate around zero, and then become significantly positive from June 2000 to May 2002, ranging from 3.454
to 5.414 basis points (8.704% to 13.643% annualized; p-value ≤ 0.05).11 After that, the upgrade portfolio generates
insignificant net abnormal returns up to June 2007, followed by significantly positive net abnormal returns from June
2007 to May 2008, ranging from 3.300 to 4.948 basis points (8.316% to 12.469% annualized; p-value ≤ 0.05). Also,
Figure 1b illustrates that the downgrade portfolio generates significantly negative net abnormal returns in the two bad
periods: (i) from June 2000 toMarch 2003, ranging from –3.970 to –7.255 basis points (–10.004% to –18.283% annu-
alized; p-value≤0.05); and (ii) fromJuly 2007 toDecember 2009, ranging from–2.661 to –7.023basis points (–6.706%
to –17.698% annualized; p-value ≤ 0.05). The statistically significant net abnormal returns to the downgrade portfolio
are not found in the remaining sample period.
Two important implications can be drawn from the patterns of Figures 1a & 1b. First, our results support Hypoth-
esis 1a (1b) that the performance of the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio is significantly positive (negative) in bad market
conditions, such as the dot-com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007, but remains statistically insignificant
in the remaining periods.We discuss the impact of market conditions on the recommendation performance in the next
subsection in more detail. Second, from an investor’s perspective, the significantly positive (negative) net abnormal
returns to the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio are exploitable, that is, it is possible for investors to make profits by pur-
chasing (short selling) stocks with publicly available upward (downward) revisions in badmarket conditions, even after
taking transaction costs into account.12 This is confirmed by our bootstrap simulations in Section 5.
4.2 The impact of market conditions on the recommendation performance
As the impact of market conditions is extremely time-period dependent and varies greatly relying on the length of the
period chosen (Derrien & Womack, 2003), we examine various time periods that encompass the time frame before
the portfolio is rebalanced. Thus, the market return variables are constructed for the one-month (MktRet_1m), two-
month (MktRet_2m), and three-month (MktRet_3m) periods before the portfolio is rebalanced as an estimate of the
buy-and-hold return on the FTSE All-Share Index. Also, a one-month weighted market return variable (MktRet_w) is
constructed as a time weighted average buy-and-hold return of the corresponding market index return in the three
months before theportfolio is rebalanced. Theweights are3 for themost recentmonth, 2 for thepreviousmonth, and1
for the thirdmonthbefore theportfolio is rebalanced, basedon the assumption that investors’ perceptions take the last
threemonths into account, but give heavierweight tomore recent periods (see, Derrien&Womack, 2003). In addition,
we choose four commonly used macroeconomic factors, including (i) the inflation rate computed from the consumer
price index (CPI), (ii) the industrial production growth (PROD), (iii) the dividend yield (DIV), and (iv) the detrended short-
term interest rate (IR), to control for the potential influence of macroeconomic situations and business cycles (see,
e.g., Flannery & Protopapadakis, 2002; Hjalmarsson, 2010). Thus, we regress the daily net abnormal returns to the
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upgrade and downgrade portfolios, separately, on a set ofmacroeconomic variables and eachmarket condition variable,
along with two indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY to control for the potential year and industry fixed effects,
respectively:
Net Abnormal Returns = � + �1CPI + �2PROD + �3DIV + �4IR + �5
[
Market Return Variable
]
+ YEAR + INDUSTRY + �. (5)
The left side of Table 3 shows that, in Regressions (2–5), all market return variables are significantly negative with
theuseof thenet abnormal returns to the upgradeportfolio as thedependent variable under theCAPM.For example, in
Regression (5), themarket return variable ofMktRet_w is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-stat=2.24), while the
coefficient of –2.165also suggests that adecreaseof1%on thedailymarket return, onaverage, gives rise toan increase
of 2.165% in the net abnormal return to the upgrade portfolio. In addition, the explanatory power of Regression (5), an
adjustedR2 of 0.240, is largely drivenby themarket return variable, as the adjustedR2 is substantially reduced to0.036
in Regression (1) when themarket return variable is excluded.
Similar to Amiram et al. (2018), we further test the impact of market conditions in terms of market volatility
(MktVol_1m), measured as the standard deviation of the daily return of the FTSE All-Share Index in the month before
the portfolio is rebalanced, on the net abnormal returns to the up/downgrade portfolio. In addition to a set ofmacroeco-
nomic variables, theweightedmarket return variable, and two indicator variables, included in Eq. (6), we introduce the
market volatility variable:
Net Abnormal Returns = � + �1CPI + �2PROD + �3DIV + �4IR + �5MktRet_w + �6MktVol_1m
+ YEAR + INDUSTRY + �. (6)
We find that, similarly to themarket return variable, themarket volatility variable plays an important role in explain-
ing the performance of the upgrade portfolio. For example, Panel A of Table 3 shows that, in Regression (6), the coeffi-
cient onMktVol_1m, 2.510 (t-stat= 2.78), is significantly positive at the 1% level, using the abnormal net returns to the
upgrade portfolio as the dependent variable. The magnitude of the coefficient onMktVol_1m suggests that an increase
of 1% inmarket volatility daily, on average, leads to an additional increase of around 2.510% in the net abnormal return
to the upgrade portfolio. The inclusion of the market volatility variable improves the explanatory power of the model,
i.e., the adjusted R2 substantially increases to 0.290 in Regression (6).
Similarly, the right side of Table 3 shows that past market return and volatility also have statistically and econom-
ically significant impacts on the net abnormal returns to the downgrade portfolio.13 In sum, the up/downgrade portfo-
lio gives rise to superior performance in the face of lower market return and/or higher market volatility, making it is
possible for investors to make profits by purchasing (short selling) stocks with publicly available upward (downward)
revisions in badmarket conditions.
4.3 Non-temporal threshold regression results
Chan et al. (2017) argue that it could be difficult to model market properties over a long-term time period including
variousmarket conditions with the use of standard linear regressionmodels. In the final part of our empirical analyses,
we employ the non-temporal threshold testing procedure, originally proposed by Hansen (2000), to test whether the
dynamic recommendation performance is sensitive to different market conditions, in terms of past market return or
market volatility. The Hansen (2000) non-temporal threshold models are as follows:14
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �B + �B
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �B,t if MktRet_wt ≤ x;
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �G + �G
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �G,t if MktRet_wt > x,
(7)
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TABLE 3 The impacts of market conditions, in terms of past market return and volatility, on the performance of the upgrade and downgrade portfolios under the CAPM
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
INTERCEPT 0.058 0.039 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.020 –0.098 –0.071 –0.069 –0.074 –0.064 –0.044
(0.97) (0.65) (0.63) (0.68) (0.66) (0.32) (–0.93) (–0.84) (–0.78) (–0.88) (–0.79) (–0.50)
CPI –0.324a –0.305a –0.317a –0.320a –0.314a –0.298a –0.257b –0.315b –0.335b –0.353a –0.365a –0.311b
(–3.31) (–3.07) (–3.19) (–3.23) (–3.16) (–3.10) (–2.26) (–2.26) (–2.50) (–2.74) (–2.78) (–2.29)
PROD –0.129c –0.136c –0.131c –0.130c –0.132c –0.124c –0.164b –0.130b –0.139a –0.132a –0.126b –0.128b
(–1.76) (–1.79) (–1.74) (–1.73) (–1.75) (–1.80) (–2.00) (–2.45) (–2.74) (–2.69) (–2.53) (–2.08)
DIV 0.588a 0.620a 0.588a 0.584a 0.589a 0.519a 0.257b 0.345b 0.316c 0.292b 0.326b 0.316b
(3.31) (3.44) (3.30) (3.27) (3.31) (3.16) (1.99) (2.13) (1.92) (1.97) (2.02) (2.26)
IR –0.106b –0.098b –0.102b –0.106b –0.101b –0.095b –0.171b –0.132b –0.110c –0.105c –0.112c –0.113c
(–2.28) (–2.10) (–2.17) (–2.19) (–2.13) (–2.01) (–2.54) (–2.00) (–1.74) (–1.78) (–1.87) (–1.89)
MktRet_1m –2.482b –2.234b
(–2.11) (–2.03)
MktRet_2m –2.174b –2.354b
(–2.26) (–2.28)
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MktRet_3m –2.023b –2.498b
(–2.02) (–2.41)
MktRet_w –2.165b –2.780b –2.372b –2.812b
(–2.24) (–2.38) (–2.20) (–2.41)
MktVol_1m 2.510a 2.468a
(2.78) (3.05)
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.036 0.243 0.236 0.239 0.240 0.290 0.111 0.217 0.230 0.231 0.211 0.401
Note: This table presents the impact ofmarket conditions, in terms of pastmarket return and volatility, on the performance of the upgrade and downgrade portfolios.We regress the daily net
abnormal returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, separately, on a set of macroeconomic variables, various market return variables, one market volatility variable, along with two
indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY to control for the potential year and industry fixed effects, respectively. The net abnormal return is calculated as the gross return subtracting the
estimated transaction costs for purchasing stocks at 1.5% and for short selling those at 3.0%,multiplied by the corresponding average daily portfolio turnover. The gross return is estimated
as the intercept term derived from the CAPM. The four macroeconomic factors are (i) the inflation rate computed from the consumer price index (CPI), (ii) the industrial production growth
(PROD), (iii) the dividend yield (DIV), (iv) the detrended short-term interest rate (IR). The market return variables are constructed for the one-month (MktRet_1m), two-month (MktRet_2m),
and three-month (MktRet_3m) periods before the portfolio is rebalanced as the buy-and-hold return on the FTSE All-Share index, respectively. The three-month weighted market return
variable (MktRet_w) is constructed as aweighted average buy-and-hold return of the correspondingmarket index return in the threemonths before the portfolio is rebalanced. Theweights
are three for the most recent month, two for the previous month, and one for the third month before the portfolio is rebalanced (Derrien &Womack, 2003). The market volatility variable
(MktVol_1m) ismeasured as the standard deviation of the daily return of the relevant FTSEAll-Share Index in themonth before the portfolio is rebalanced. The performanceof the downgrade
portfolio is measured as the signed net abnormal returns multiplied by −1. The White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. a , b , and c denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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and
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �B + �B
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �B,t if MktVol_1mt ≥ x;
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �G + �G
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �G,t if MktVol_1mt < x,
(8)
where x is the threshold value of market return (MktRet_w) or market volatility (MktVol_1m) to be estimated by the
maxim and of the likelihood ratio statistics over all permissible values; the subscripts of B and G represent the bad and
goodmarket conditions, respectively.
The Hansen (2000) non-temporal threshold testing procedure as described in Eqs. (7–8) might ignore the possibil-
ity of multiple non-temporal thresholds. Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) extend the procedure by applying the multiple
structural change analysis of Bai and Perron (1998). Themultiple non-temporal thresholdmodels are as follows:
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �1 + �1
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �1,t if MktRet_wt ≤ x1;
⋮
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �j + �j
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �j,t if xj−1 < MktRet_wt ≤ xj;
⋮
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �k+1 + �k
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �k,t if xk < MktRet_wt ,
(9)
and
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �1 + �1
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �1,t if MktVol_1mt ≥ x1;
⋮
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �j + �j
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �j,t if xj−1 > MktVol_1mt ≥ xj;
⋮
[
Net Abnormal Returns
]
t
= �k+1 + �k
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �k,t if xk > MktVol_1mt ,
(10)
where k represents the number of thresholds. Specifically, the multiple non-temporal threshold testing procedure
beginswith the null hypothesis of zero threshold against the alternative of one threshold; if this is rejected, it proceeds
to two thresholds, and so on. The threshold testing results are based on the p-values computed by the asymptotically
correct bootstrap procedure proposed by Hansen (2000).
The left side of Table 4 reports a statistically significant Threshold 1 (0.075; t-stat = 2.77), at the 1% level, but an
insignificant Threshold 2 (0.051; t-stat = 1.06), indicating the presence of one break, but not of two breaks, when mar-
ket conditions are proxied as thepastmarket return in the caseof theperformanceof theupgradeportfolio. Specifically,
the coefficient of �B is significantly negative, –0.123 (t-stat = –2.49), at the 5% level, when the market return is below
the identified Threshold 1, while the coefficient of �G (0.025; t-stat = 0.31) is statistically insignificant when market
return is above the threshold. In addition, whenmarket conditions are proxied by the past market volatility, the coeffi-
cient of �B is significantly positive, 0.233 (t-stat = 2.64), at the 1% level, when market volatility is above the identified
Threshold 1, while the coefficient of �G (0.022; t-stat= 0.12) is statistically insignificant whenmarket volatility is below
the threshold.
Overall, our non-temporal analysis results show that the performance of the upgrade portfolio increases in badmar-
ket conditions (i.e., lower market return and/or higher market volatility). But, once market conditions become better
and exceed a certain level, the negative impact of market conditions on the recommendation performance disappears.
Our results confirm the importance of taking non-linearity into account when analyzing the relationship between the
time-varying recommendation performance andmarket conditions. The right side of Table 4 shows similar evidence in
the case of the performance of the downgrade portfolio, confirmingHypothesis 1 that the average net abnormal return
to the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio is significantly positive (negative) in badmarket conditions, but remains statistically
insignificant in the rest of the sample period.
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TABLE 4 Non-temporal threshold regression analysis results under the CAPM
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
Market conditions in terms of MktRet_w MktVol_1m MktRet_w MktVol_1m
Threshold 1 0.075a 0.011a 0.076a 0.010a
(2.77) (2.67) (2.64) (2.70)
Threshold 2 0.051 0.007 0.046 0.006
(1.06) (0.66) (0.89) (0.53)
Constant (Bad) 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005
(0.57) (0.45) (0.36) (0.63)
Constant (Good) 0.013c 0.011b 0.016b 0.010c
(1.85) (2.04) (2.21) (1.83)
�B –0.123
b 0.233a –0.085b 0.144b
(2.49) (2.64) (2.12) (2.46)
�G 0.025 0.022 0.029 0.026
(0.31) (0.12) (0.53) (0.42)
adj. R2 (Bad) 0.205 0.237 0.172 0.187
adj. R2 (Good) 0.032 0.029 0.043 0.037
Note: This table presents empirical evidence on whether the dynamic recommendation performance is sensitive to differ-
ent market conditions, in terms of past market returns or market volatility, using the non-temporal threshold testing proce-
dure, proposed by Hansen (2000) as shown in Eqs. (7–8). The threshold value of market return (MktRet_w) or market volatility
(MktVol_1m) is estimatedby themaximof the likelihood ratio statistics over all permissible values. Specifically, the three-month
weighted market return variable (MktRet_w) is constructed as a weighted average buy-and-hold return of the corresponding
market index return in three months before the portfolio is rebalanced. The weights are three for the most recent month, two
for the next, and one for the third month before the portfolio is rebalanced (Derrien & Womack, 2003). The market volatil-
ity variable (MktVol_1m) is measured as the standard deviation of the daily return of the relevant FTSE All-Share Index in one
month before the portfolio is rebalanced. The parameter estimates of �B and �G are generated under the CAPM, and the sub-
scripts of B and G indicate bad and good market conditions, respectively. The performance of the downgrade portfolio is mea-
sured as the signed net abnormal returns multiplied by −1. TheWhite heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported
in parenthesis. a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In Subsection 5.1, we develop a time-series bootstrap simulation method to distinguish analysts’ luck from skill. Our
bootstrap simulation results confirm that the observed significant time-specific portfolio performance based on ana-
lyst recommendation revisions is not due to random chance, that is, analysts possess sufficient skill to make valuable
upgrades and downgrades in bad market conditions. Subsection 5.2 provides very strong evidence showing that our
empirical results are robust to variousmulti-factor assets pricingmodels, ruling out the concern that our results might
be due to a poormodel of asset pricing (Barber et al., 2001).
5.1 Bootstrap simulations
5.1.1 Time-series bootstrap simulationmethod
Kosowski, Timmermann,Wermers, andWhite (2006) develop a cross-sectional bootstrap simulationmethod onmutual
funds research, which resamples the residuals from individual fund returns independently, but remains the effect of
common risk factors fixed historically. Fama and French (2010, p. 1940), however, argue that “failure to account for
the joint distribution of fund returns, and of fund and explanatory returns, biases the inferences of Kosowski et al.
(2006) toward positive performance”. Extending Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010) jointly resample
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both the residuals and risk factors, ceteris paribus. Inspired by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010),
we develop a rolling window based bootstrap simulation method to distinguish analysts’ luck from skill. Note that
our method measures the performance distribution of the best performing rolling windows not only by resampling
from the distribution of the ex-post best performing rolling windows, but using the information about luck repre-
sented by all rolling windows. This is a major difference between our method and those employed in previous stud-
ies, which generally ignore the possibility that luck distribution encountered by all other performance distributions
also provides highly valuable and relevant information (see, e.g., Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, & O’Sullivan, 2008; White,
2000). Our rolling window based bootstrap simulation method thus allows for a comprehensive investigation into the
time-varying recommendation performance after explicitly controlling for luck and alleviating the potential bias from
misspecification.
First, in the first one-year rolling window of January 3, 1995 to December 29, 1995, we run the CAPM to calcu-
late the estimated alphas, factor loadings, and residuals, using the time series of daily excess returns for the portfolio,
{(Rp,t − Rf,t); t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252}, where Tp,1 and Tp,252 are the first and last trading dates, respectively, in the rolling
window:
Rp,t − Rf,t = �̂p + �̂p
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �̂p,t. (11)
Second, we save the coefficient estimates, {�̂p, �̂p}, the time series of estimated residuals, {�̂p,t; t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252},
and the t-statistic of alpha, t̂�̂p .
Third, we generate a pseudo-time series of resampled residuals {�̂b
p,tb
; tb = T
b
p,1
,… , Tb
p,252
} by randomly drawing
residuals from the saved residual vector {�̂p,t} with replacements, where b is the bootstrap simulation index. In the
sameway, we generate a pseudo-time series of market risk {(Rm,tb − Rf,tb )
b
} by randomly drawingmarket risk from the
original risk factor vector {(Rm,t − Rf,t)}with replacements.
Fourth, we generate a time series of pseudo-daily excess returns (Rp,t − Rf,t)
b in the rollingwindow, imposing the null
hypothesis of zero true performance (�p = 0):
{
(
Rp,t − Rf,t
)b
= 0 + �̂p
(
Rm,tb − Rf,tb
)b
+ �̂b
p,tb
}
, (12)
where t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252; tb = T
b
p,1
,… , Tb
p,252
.
Finally, we regress the pseudo-daily excess returns (Rp,t − Rf,t)
b on themarket factor:
(
Rp,t − Rf,t
)b
= �̂bp + �̂p
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ �̂p,t . (13)
The simulated �̂bp represents the sampling variation around zero true performance, entirely due to random chance
(luck). Repeating the above steps in each of the 4,420 rolling windows over the period January 1996 to June 2013,
we obtain a time series of simulated alphas, {�̂bp}, and their corresponding t-statistics, {t̂�̂bp
}. We then order all simu-
lated �̂bp into a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of simulated �̂
b
p–a separate time series of luck distribution from
theworst performing rollingwindow to the best performing rollingwindow, all ofwhich are completely due to analysts’
luck rather than skill. In this study, we repeat the above bootstrap simulation 10,000 times, say, b= 1,…, 10,000.
5.1.2 Bootstrap simulation results
We focus on presenting the distribution of t-statistics of the net abnormal returns to the upgrade and downgrade port-
folios, as the t-statistic scales the net abnormal return by its standard errors and thus has superior statistical properties
(see, Fama& French, 2010;Meyer et al., 2012).15 Specifically, we compare the values of the t-statistics at selected per-
centiles of CDFs of the actual t-statistics with the averages of the 10,000 simulated t-statistics at the same percentiles.
We reject the null hypothesis that the portfolio performance is due to randomchance (at the 95%confidence level) and
infer that analysts have skill at this percentile when the actual t-statistic is higher than the simulated t-statistic in 95%
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TABLE 5 The percentiles of t-statistics of the actual and simulated net abnormal returns to the upgrade and
downgrade portfolios under the CAPM
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
%
Simulated
t-stat
Actual
t-stat
% (Simu-
lated<Actual)
Simulated
t-stat
Actual
t-stat
% (Simu-
lated<Actual)
1 –0.52 –0.82 1.87 –0.78 –0.95 1.92
2 –0.11 –0.47 2.95 –0.35 –0.58 2.95
3 0.15 –0.26 3.44 –0.09 –0.35 3.63
4 0.29 –0.11 4.54 0.08 –0.21 4.54
5 0.38 –0.01 5.77 0.20 –0.11 6.19
10 0.64 0.31 6.56 0.52 0.16 7.37
20 0.87 0.65 8.50 0.78 0.51 9.42
30 1.02 0.85 14.68 0.92 0.70 14.61
40 1.14 1.01 17.63 1.01 0.81 20.48
50 1.26 1.18 24.17 1.06 0.92 31.63
60 1.37 1.35 37.47 1.10 1.02 50.74
70 1.50 1.54 55.82 1.15 1.16 54.66
80 1.66 1.77 61.66 1.26 1.37 68.87
90 1.94 2.10 68.07 1.48 1.72 81.03
95 2.25 2.41 77.24 1.75 2.06 86.30
96 2.35 2.51 83.71 1.85 2.17 88.16
97 2.51 2.68 89.23 2.00 2.36 91.90
98 2.73 2.89 92.70 2.18 2.57 93.97
99 2.94 3.16 95.71 2.57 3.11 96.47
Note: This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics of the actual
and simulated net abnormal returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, as well as the percentage of the 10,000 sim-
ulation runs that produce lower values of t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual net abnormal returns (%
Simulated<Actual) over the period January 1996 to June 2013. The net abnormal return is calculated as the gross return sub-
tracting the estimated round-trip transaction costs for purchasing stocks at 1.5% and for short selling those at 3.0%,multiplied
by the corresponding average daily portfolio turnover. The gross return is estimated as the intercept term derived from the
CAPM. The performance of the downgrade portfolio is measured as the signed net abnormal returnsmultiplied by−1.
ormore of the 10,000 simulations. Our simulation results in Table 5mirror the net abnormal returns to the upgrade and
downgrade portfolios under the CAPM.
The left side of Table 5 shows that the left tail percentiles of the actual t-statistics of the net abnormal returns to
the upgrade portfolio are below the corresponding average values from the simulations. For example, the 5th and 10th
percentiles of the actual t-statistics, –0.01 and 0.31, respectively, aremuch lower than the corresponding average sim-
ulated values of 0.38 and 0.64, suggesting that the relatively poor portfolio performance in the left tails over some time
periods is due to analysts’ inferior skill rather than their poor luck. Thus, the left tails of theCDFs of t-statistics indicate
the existence of some time periods, during which analysts’ upward revisions could not result in positive true alpha rel-
ative to the passive benchmark. Thus, it is unlikely that investors could make profits by purchasing stocks with upward
revisions in these time periods.
However, the right tails of the CDFs of t-statistics suggest that, on average, analysts have skill in making valuable
upward revisions that can cover the size of transaction costs over some time periods (e.g., in bad market conditions).
Specifically, the right tail percentiles of the actual t-statistics are always higher than the corresponding average simu-
lated values for all percentiles above the 70th. For example, the 90th (95th) percentile of the actual t-statistics is 2.10
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F IGURE 2 The actual and simulated cumulative density functions (CDFs) of t-statistics of the net abnormal
returns to the up/downgrade portfolio, under the CAPM
(2.41), much higher than the corresponding average simulated value of 1.94 (2.25). In particular, under the CAPM, the
99th percentile of the actual t-statistics is higher than the corresponding simulated t-statistics at the 95% confidence
level, confirming the existence of some time periods duringwhich upward revisionsmade by analysts can generate sta-
tistically significant net abnormal returns. We further confirm that a vast majority of these time periods showing the
significant recommendation performance happen in bad market conditions. Similarly, Figure 2a illustrates the CDFs
of the actual t-statistics of the net abnormal returns to the upgrade portfolio and the corresponding CDFs from the
simulations, under the CAPM.
The right side of Table 5 shows that the left tail percentiles of the actual t-statistics of the net abnormal returns to
the downgrade portfolio are still to the left of the corresponding average values from the simulations, irrespective of
the asset pricing models employed. For example, the 5th and 10th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are −0.11 and
0.16, respectively,much lower than the corresponding average simulated values of 0.20 and0.52, again suggesting that
the relatively poor portfolio performance in the left tails is due to analysts’ inferior skill over some time periods rather
than their poor luck. Therefore, the left tails of theCDFs of t-statistics suggest that it is unlikely that investors canmake
profits by short selling stocks with downgrade revisions over these time periods.
In contrast, the right tail percentiles of the actual t-statistics suggest that, on average, analysts have skill in making
valuable downward revisions over some time periods. Specifically, the CDF of the actual t-statistics under the CAPM
moves to the right of the average values at about the 70th percentile from the simulations. For example, the 90th and
95th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are 1.72 and 2.06, respectively, higher than the corresponding average simu-
lated values of 1.48 and 1.75. In particular, the 99th percentile of the actual t-statistics are higher than the correspond-
ing simulated t-statistics at the 95% confidence level, confirming the existence of some time periods, during which
analysts show skill in making valuable downward revisions; almost all of these time periods showing the significant
recommendation performance happen in badmarket conditions. Similarly, Figure 2b illustrates the CDFs of the actual
t-statistics of the net abnormal returns to the downgrade portfolio and the corresponding CDFs from the simulations,
under the CAPM.
In summary, our bootstrap simulations suggest that financial analysts have sufficient skills in making valuable
upward and downward revisions over certain time periods, i.e., bad market conditions, rather than during the whole
sample period.
5.2 Alternativemulti-factor asset pricingmodels
Wealso estimate the gross returns to the up/downgradeportfolio using the Fama andFrench (1993) three-factormodel
(hereafter, the FFmodel) and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (hereafter, the FFCmodel):
Rp,t − Rf,t = �p + �p
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + �p,t; (14)
Rp,t − Rf,t = �p + �p
(
Rm,t − Rf,t
)
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt +mpMOMt + �p,t , (15)
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where SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt represent the daily returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size,
book-to-market (B/M), and pricemomentum, respectively.16
Using theFFandFFCmodels,we further replicate all empirical investigations in Section4 andbootstrap simulations
in Subsection 5.1, confirming that our results are qualitatively unchanged. These robustness results are provided as
supplementarymaterials (see Tables A1–A3 and Figures A1–A4).
6 CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the time-varying performanceof analyst recommendation revisions in theUK, using a comprehen-
sive sample of 70,220 analyst recommendation revisions over the period January 1995 to June 2013.We construct an
upgrade portfolio, consisting of all stocks with upward revisions to Strong Buy or Buy recommendations from previous
Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold recommendations, as well as a downgrade portfolio, consisting of all stocks with downward
revisions to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold recommendations from previous Strong Buy or Buy recommendations. Specif-
ically, the upgrade and downgrade portfolios are updated daily; for each upward or downward revision, the recom-
mended stock enters the upgrade or downgrade portfolio at the close of trading on the day the revision is announced,
and then remains in the portfolio for up to five trading days.
First, we find that the performance of the upgrade and downgrade portfolios varies considerably over time on a
rolling-window basis. In particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates significantly positive (negative) net
abnormal returns in bad market conditions, e.g., the dot-com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007. In
addition, we find that the time-varying portfolio performance is driven by market conditions as measured in terms
of both pastmarket return andmarket volatility. Specifically, the up/downgrade portfolio leads to superior performance
in bad conditions, i.e., in periods where there are lower market return and/or higher market volatility. Subsequently,
we employ the Hansen (2000) non-temporal threshold regression model to test whether the dynamic recommenda-
tion performance is sensitive to different market conditions. Our non-temporal analysis results confirm that signifi-
cantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns to the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio in bad market conditions, while
once market conditions become better and exceed a certain level, the observed impact of market conditions on the
recommendation performance disappears.
Our results hold up against an array of robustness checks, including bootstrap simulations and various multi-factor
asset pricing models. Our bootstrap simulations confirm that the observed significant time-specific recommendation
performance is due to analysts’ skill rather than luck (i.e., random chance). That is, analysts possess sufficient skill to
make valuable upgrades and downgrades over certain time periods, which are related to changing market conditions.
Also, our results are robust to various single- and multi-factor assets pricing models, ruling out Barber et al. (2001)
concern that the observed significant recommendation performance could be due to a poormodel of asset pricing.
In summary, we find strong evidence from the UKmarket broadly supporting Loh and Stulz (2018) that analyst rec-
ommendations aremore valuable in bad times than good. Future researchmight seek to further confirm the generality
of findings in other market settings and also to investigate the detailed reasons for the effect.
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ENDNOTES
1 For example, the ring fencing requirements of the Vickers Report lead to a significant restructuring of the UK banking sys-
tem (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2016). See more discussions on the differences of market structure in the two markets in
the speech of ‘Comparing UK and USMacroprudential Systems: Lessons for China’ given byDonald Kohn at theGlobal Financial
Forum, Tsinghua University, Beijing, on 11May, 2014 (available at: https://goo.gl/SHWkdX).
2 Extant analyst research generally conducts event-time analysis, but these event studies fail to capture the possibility that
markets evolve over time. In addition, Barber et al. (2001) point out that event-time analysis does not measure the profits
to an implementable investment strategy (see McWilliams, Siegel, & Teoh, 1999 for more discussions on the problems and
associated solutions related to event studies).
3 In addition, Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) report that stock prices react significantly to analyst recommendation revisions in
the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized counties fromNovember 1993 to July 2002, except for Italy. They further point out
that US analysts aremore skilled at identifyingmispriced stocks than their counterparts in theG7 counties, probably due to
the better compensation structure in the USmarket.
4 In addition, Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) report that stock prices react significantly to analyst recommendation revisions in
the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized counties fromNovember 1993 to July 2002, except for Italy. They further point out
that US analysts aremore skilled at identifyingmispriced stocks than their counterparts in theG7 counties, probably due to
the better compensation structure in the USmarket.
5 Reactions to analyst recommendation revisions during the first few days after their announcements (see, e.g., Stickel, 1995;
Womack, 1996; Green, 2006).
6 If a stock is recommended by more than one brokerage house on a given date, then that stock will appear multiple times in
the portfolio on that date, once for each brokerage house (see, Barber, Lehavy, & Trueman, 2007). Specifically, in our sample,
a very small proportion (4.29%) of analyst recommendation revisions is made by more than one BH on a given date, e.g.,
3.24% (832 out of 25,701) of upgrades and 5.19% (1,575 out of 30,374) downgrades.
7 Like Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, and Agarwal (2009), we exclude 4,297 upward revisions and 4,847 downward revisions
on utilities and financials (the two-digit ICB codes 75, 83, and 85–87) due to their highly regulated nature, and replicate
all empirical analyses in Sections 4 and 5, showing qualitatively similar results, which are not reported to save space, but
available on request. In fact, it is a common practice for the analyst research not to exclude financials and/or utilities (see,
e.g., Barber et al., 2001, 2007; Green, 2006, Fang & Yasuda, 2014), as financial analysts oftenmake stock recommendations
focusing on one particular industry or sector.
8We explicitly exclude the return on the first trading day, as many investors, particularly small investors, tend to react to
information with a delay. Barber et al. (2001, p. 534) argue that “it is impractical for them to engage in the daily portfolio
rebalancing that is needed to respond to the changes”.
9 The value-weighted returns enable us to better capture the economic significance of our results, while the equal-weighted
returns are, on average, biased upward due to the bid-ask bounce, that is, the returns of large size firmswill bemore heavily
represented in the aggregate returns than those of small size firms (see, Barber et al., 2001).
10 Similarly, Barber et al. (2001) estimate the average round-trip transaction costs of 1.31% in the US. Despite the lack of
readily available data regarding short selling costs in the UK, we assume a short selling cost of 3.0%, according to Su, Zhang,
Bangassa, and Joseph (2019).
11 In fact, ifmarkets are truly efficient, the t-statistics of thenet abnormal returns shouldbewithin the95%confidence interval
(p-value≥ 0.05) over the entire sample period, that is, the absolute values of t-statistics should be consistently less than the
critical value of 1.96 (Kim et al., 2011).
12Our results are qualitatively unchangedwhen the recommended stocks remain in the up/downgradeportfolio for three trad-
ing days, suggesting that early access to analyst recommendation revisions could generate incremental investment value
(see, also, Li, 2005; Green, 2006). Not surprisingly, the reported significant net abnormal returns to the up/downgrade port-
folio disappear when the recommended stocks remain in the portfolio until the recommendations are changed or expired
(an average of 68 days as shown in Appendix A), consistent with prior analyst research. For example, in Barber et al. (2007),
the recommended stock enters the appropriate portfolio at the close of trading on the day the stock recommendation is
released, and remains in the portfolio until the recommendation is either up/downgraded or dropped from coverage by the
brokerage house, while such investment strategies generate no consistently profitable performance after taking transac-
tion costs into account (see, also, Barber et al., 2001; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004;Mikhail,Walther, &Willis, 2004;
Hall & Tacon, 2010).
13 In Tables 3–5, we present the performance of the downgrade portfolio as the signed net abnormal returns multiplied by −1
tomake direct comparisonwith the performance of the upgrade portfolio.
SU ET AL. 85
14 Specifically, we first estimate the threshold parameter and the coefficient estimates to obtain the associated residuals; we
then re-order the residuals temporally andperform the test for serial correlationsusing the re-ordered residuals. Therefore,
the inclusion of only the first lag of the dependent variable is sufficient to ensure that the residuals do not exhibit serial cor-
relation. The threshold test results are based on the p-values measured by the asymptotically correct bootstrap procedure
proposed by Hansen (2000).
15 Specifically, we use the Newey–West heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to calculate t-statistics. Like Meyer et al.
(2012), we do not account for autocorrelation for twomain reasons. First, themajority of rollingwindow regressions do not
report autocorrelation at the 5% significance level using the Breusch-Godfrey test. Second, it has the advantage of enhanc-
ing the comparability between simulated and actual t-statistics through a uniform test specification. This is because our
time-series bootstrap simulations consist of random drawings of individual daily returns with replacements, which means
the time series drawn cannot contain any true underlying autocorrelation by design.
16 The daily returns on size, value, and momentum in the UK stock market are collected from the Xfi Centre for Finance and
Investment at University of Exeter.
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APPENDIX A: THE DISTRIBUTION OF UK ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS
Analyst recommendation frequency
Strong
Buys (1 & 2) Buys (3 & 4) Holds (5) Sells (6 & 7)
Strong
Sells (8 & 9)
Year
No. of firms
covered
No. of broke-
rage houses
Average
duration
Average
rating
No. of analyst
recommendations No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1995 861 28 92.7 2.49 12,516 4,508 36.02 702 5.61 5,526 44.15 263 2.10 1,517 12.12
1996 1,041 41 83.0 2.35 21,289 8,234 38.68 1,687 7.92 9,000 42.28 502 2.36 1,866 8.77
1997 1,172 50 68.9 2.21 29,988 13,179 43.95 2,520 8.40 11,409 38.05 676 2.25 2,204 7.35
1998 1,220 52 60.3 2.23 29,939 12,487 41.71 3,826 12.48 10,214 34.12 1,213 4.05 2,199 7.34
1999 1,167 50 67.9 2.14 26,274 11,308 43.04 4,046 15.40 8,373 31.87 997 3.79 1,550 5.90
2000 1,102 56 69.2 2.01 22,090 10,325 46.74 3,647 16.51 6,560 29.70 633 2.87 925 4.19
2001 1,100 52 73.8 2.33 19,819 7,639 38.54 2,545 12.84 6,855 34.59 1,056 5.33 1,724 8.70
2002 1,061 49 83.7 2.31 17,928 7,467 41.65 2,041 11.38 5,560 31.01 1,146 6.39 1,714 9.56
2003 1,019 55 66.0 2.26 20,250 8,768 43.30 2,225 10.99 6,264 30.93 1,125 5.56 1,868 9.22
2004 1,038 60 62.0 2.26 23,621 10,096 42.74 2,725 11.54 7,546 31.95 1,096 4.64 2,158 9.14
2005 1,111 59 61.2 2.37 24,976 9,743 39.01 2,737 10.96 8,572 34.32 1,302 5.21 2,622 10.50
2006 1,174 60 61.1 2.20 23,775 10,781 45.35 2,514 10.57 7,275 30.60 1,237 5.20 1,968 8.28
2007 1,169 55 63.8 2.10 18,629 9,151 49.12 1,972 10.59 5,398 28.98 742 3.98 1,366 7.33
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Analyst recommendation frequency
Strong
Buys (1 & 2) Buys (3 & 4) Holds (5) Sells (6 & 7)
Strong
Sells (8 & 9)
Year
No. of firms
covered
No. of broke-
rage houses
Average
duration
Average
rating
No. of analyst
recommendations No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
2008 1,153 62 63.5 2.16 19,370 9,776 50.47 1,536 7.93 5,329 27.51 696 3.59 2,033 10.50
2009 1,034 60 61.7 2.18 21,417 10,318 48.18 1,987 9.28 6,208 28.99 685 3.20 2,219 10.36
2010 1,003 44 70.3 1.92 16,794 9,616 57.26 1,366 8.13 4,440 26.44 265 1.58 1,107 6.59
2011 964 44 74.0 1.95 16,389 9,175 55.98 1,398 8.53 4,440 27.09 254 1.55 1,122 6.85
2012 947 44 69.2 1.97 13,587 7,521 55.35 1,066 7.85 3,842 28.28 169 1.24 989 7.28
2013
(January
to June)
724 33 69.8 2.12 5,514 2,741 49.71 413 7.49 1,791 32.48 69 1.25 500 9.07
Overall 2,905 144 68.0 2.20 384,165 172,833 44.99 40,953 10.66 124,602 32.43 14,126 3.68 31,651 8.24
Note: This appendix presents the distribution of 384,165 UK analyst recommendations in each year over the period January 1995 to June 2013, in terms of the number of recommended
firms, thenumberofbrokeragehouses, aswell as theaverage ratingandnumberof analyst recommendations.All real-timeanalyst recommendationsareobtained fromMorningstarCompany
Intelligence. A ratingof 1 reflects a strongbuy, 2 abuy, 3 aweakbuy, 4 aweakbuy/hold, 5 ahold, 6 ahold/sell, 7 aweak sell, 8 a sell, and9a strong sell,which are reclassified into five categories:
Strong Buy (1 & 2), Buy (3 & 4), Hold (5), Sell (6 & 7), and Strong Sell (8 & 9).We report the average rating for analyst recommendations in each year based on the five-point rating scale. The
average duration reflects the gap between the starting and expiration dates of analyst recommendations.
